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Abstract
The focus of the present study is on consumer health information in relation to supplier
induced demand (SID). We argue that previously used measures of consumer health information
are not suitable to identify SID. Using a new information measure based on questions of the Swiss
Health Survey, we estimate a Poisson hurdle model for office visits. We find that information
has a negative effect on health care utilization, thus providing evidence for the SID hypothesis.
JEL-Classification: I11, I18, C24
Keywords: Supplier-Induced Demand; Consumer Information; Poisson-hurdle model
∗I am grateful to Robert E. Leu, Michael Gerfin, Stefan Boes, Boris Kaiser, Stephan Fretz, and seminar participants
at Bern (2012) and conference participants at Bochum (2013) for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
†University of Bern, Department of Economics, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland. E-mail: chris-
tian.schmid@vwi.unibe.ch. Phone: +41 31 631 80 80. Fax: +41 31 631 39 92
1
SID - What kind of consumer information matters? 2
1 Introduction
The supplier-induced demand (SID) hypothesis dates back to the seminal work of Arrow (1963)
on consumer information in the health care market and the insight that conventional supply and
demand models are not applicable to the health care market (Feldstein, 1970; Evans, 1974; Fuchs,
1978; Green, 1978). According to the inducement hypothesis, health care providers are suspected
to exploit their information advantage for financial gains while acting as agents for their patients.
As a result, the uninformed patients consume medical services which they would refuse if they had
the same medical expertise as e.g. their physician. However, there is no consensus among health
economists as to whether the information asymmetry at hand leads to serious misbehavior of health
care providers (see e.g. Stano, 1987, or Labelle et al., 1994), even though a majority of economists
and physicians suspect that health care providers induce demand (McGuire, 2000).
Although the central issue is well understood in theory, testing the SID hypothesis turns out to be
quite difficult in practice. Van Doorslaer and Geurts (1987) use time-varying covariates to analyze
the behavior of physicians facing financial incentives. Grytten and Sorensen (1999, 2001) compare
physicians by their type of contract and Iversen (2004) as well as Grytten and Sorensen (2007, 2008)
analyze the behavioral response of physicians to a patient shortage. However, the findings of these
studies provide only indirect evidence for or against the SID hypothesis. In other words, there is no
direct link between the empirical approach and the theoretical foundation of the SID hypothesis, i.e.
the information asymmetry between patients and physicians. Two exceptions are Hay and Leahy
(1982) and Kenkel (1990) where the empirical approach relies directly on the information gap. Hay
and Leahy measure consumer health information by the occupation, i.e. individuals working in the
health care sector are assumed to have more information on health services, and Kenkel uses survey
questions about symptoms. Individuals with a high level of information are then supposed to be
less prone to demand inducement, but the empirical findings suggest that information has a positive
effect on health care demand.
The focus of the present study is to examine whether SID exists for physician services in Switzer-
land. We argue that medical occupation and symptom knowledge are inaccurate measures of con-
sumer information. Using an unique measure of consumer information based on responses to survey
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questions about health competence, we estimate the demand for office visits within a hurdle model
framework. Our contribution to the literature is the use of this novel measure of consumer infor-
mation and the application of the Poisson hurdle model in this context. To our knowledge, we
are the first to use this particular estimation strategy to test the SID hypothesis. Our empirical
results indicate that the number of office visits decrease with a higher level of consumer information.
Hence, we find evidence in favor of the SID hypothesis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical
background on consumer health information. Section 3 provides some details on the Swiss health
care system and section 4 presents the data and the empirical approach. The key findings are
discussed in section 5. Finally, the last section contains some concluding remarks and deals with
some limitations of the analysis.
2 Consumer Health Information and the Demand for Health Care
The conceptual framework for our analysis is based on Grossmann’s (1972) human capital model and
is related to Dranove’s (1988) model on the physician-patient relationship.1 The former implies that
medical care is considered as an input into the consumer’s production of health and health itself is
assumed to be a durable capital stock. An increase in health is directly associated with utility gains
and indirectly due to greater efficiency of both leisure time and consumption. In this framework,
the consumers decide on the utility maximizing investment in health based on the marginal benefits
and costs of medical care. However, consumers have only imperfect information about their own
health conditions, the marginal benefits of medical care, the provider quality and the choice among
medical care alternatives. Therefore, health information is valuable to consumers since it enables
them to improve decisions about medical care (Arrow, 1963; Kenkel, 1990). Note that the extent of
consumers’ information depends on the relation between the expected value of information and costs
of acquiring information. The expected value and costs are determined by individual characteristics,
e.g. the education level. In addition, more than one type of consumer health information has to be
considered since purchasing medical care involves several decisions (see e.g. Kenkel, 1990). There
1In what follows, we assume that physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis. This assumption ensures that
physicians actually have an incentive to induce demand.
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are at least three types of information (Haas-Wilson, 2001): First, diagnostic information denotes
the patient’s ability to determine what is causing illnessess and symptoms. Second, physician-
specific quality information enables the patient to improve its provider choice in terms of quality
and specialty. Third, treatment information denotes the patient’s ability to distinguish between
necessary treatment and induced demand.2 Although all types of information are associated with
improved decisions about medical care, only treatment information enables the patient to better
evaluate the necessity of a recommended treatment. However, diagnostic information and physician-
specific quality information could have an indirect effect on recommended treatments or demand for
specific medical services, e.g. office visits. In addition, while conducting empirical investigations one
has to carefully appraise which type of information is measured since e.g. diagnostic information
may not be suitable to find evidence for or against the SID hypothesis. Therefore, we will discuss
the theoretical as well as the observed effects of all types of consumer information on health care
demand in more detail.
With respect to demand inducement, the central issue is the patient’s ability to evaluate the
treatment advice of the health care provider, e.g. a physician. In the model of Dranove (1988),
supplier induced demand exists whenever physicians are better informed than their patients. In
addition, one prediction of the model is an inverse relationship between inducement and the patient’s
treatment information. Using a game-theoretic approach, Xie et al. (2006) and De Jaegher (2012)
extend the model of Dranove by introducing a patient population with heterogenous (treatment)
information. According to the authors, an individual increase in patient information does not
necessarily decrease demand inducement. To alter physician behavior, a sufficiently large fraction
of the population has to be well-informed and the increase in the individual patient information has
to be large enough, respectively.
While these theoretical results predict a (weakly) negative effect of consumer information on
demand inducement, the empirical evidence is rather converse. Using medical occupation as proxy,
Hay and Leahy (1982) find a positive effect of information on physician visits. However, medical
2The nomenclature of the different information types is not standardized throughout the literature. In particular,
Dranove (1988) uses the term ‘diagnostic skills’ for the patient’s ability to distinguish between necessary treatment and
induced demand while Haas-Wilson (2001) uses the term ‘diagnostic information’ for the patient’s ability to determine
what is causing illnesses and symptoms. Note that we stick to the nomenclature of Haas-Wilson. Consequently,
‘treatment information’ denotes the patient’s ability to distinguish between necessary treatment and induced demand.
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professionals might have another attitude towards medical care or health, and it is possible that
individuals working in the health care sector have access to informal care, e.g. ‘professional courtesy’
(see Bunker and Brown, 1974). In addition, a treatment received by a medical professional might
be more effective since the individual itself can add something. For example, a nurse can change a
bandage herself or a pharmacist knows whether a prescribed drug adversely interacts with another
drug that she takes. Therefore, medical occupation might be unsuitable to test the SID hypothesis
since it is unlikely that the profession measures merely treatment information.3 Based on survey
questions about symptoms of four diseases, Kenkel (1990) finds a positive effect of information on
utilization. However, knowledge of symptoms might rather improve the decision (process) to visit a
physician than the patient’s ability to distinguish between necessary treatment and induced demand.
In fact, Kenkel concludes that information plays the dominant role in increasing the probability of
health service utilization. Using data on health information searching behavior from non-physician
sources and a measure for trust in physicians, Dwyer and Liu (2013) find a positive effect of consumer
health information on the probability to visit a physician as well as the number of physician visits
but a decrease in the probability to visit the emergency room. Although the estimated effects are
consistent with previous results in the literature, searching for health information and being well-
informed is not the same. Concretely, the former could be simply an indication of anxiety or risk
aversion which affects both the probability to visit a physician and the number of visits. In addition,
health information from e.g. the internet can result in a higher demand for health care services due to
larger concerns about the own health, or consumers might lack the ability to understand the given
information (see e.g. Suziedelyte, 2012). In summary, previous findings suggest that consumer
information mostly increases health care consumption and, therefore, contradicts the theoretical
implications. However, it is likely that the employed information measures are not suitable to test
the SID hypothesis.
Although we focus on patient information given a strictly positive demand where SID can take
place, the decision to visit a physician must also be taken into account since demand inducement is
3The idea to compare physicians (and their families) with other professional groups dates back to Bunker and
Brown (1974) and has been extended by Domenighetti et al. (1993). However, their analysis is based on the fact that
e.g. lawyers are considered by their physicians ‘special patients’ since lawyers might be able to cause more litigation.
Thus, the similarity of the prevalence between physicians and other professional groups (compared to the rest of the
population) and not the medical occupation per se is used to test the SID hypothesis.
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probably affected indirectly. In particular, badly and well informed individuals in terms of diagnostic
information and physician specific quality information could have different consumption patterns.
First, Parente et al. (2005) and Hsieh and Lin (1997) show that knowledge of insurance benefits and
(diagnostic) information, respectively, increase the demand for preventive care. Since preventive
care is mostly associated with a decrease of either the probability or the severity of illness (see e.g.
Phelps, 1978; Kenkel, 1994; Tian et al., 2010), the demand for curative care could depend negatively
on preventive care. In addition, diagnostic information is likely to improve the patient’s choice
among health care provider alternatives, i.e. pharmacies, general practitioners, medical specialists,
and hospitals (see e.g. Dwyer and Liu, 2013). Consequently, unnecessary follow-up visits due to
inappropriate provider choices decrease with diagnostic information.4 Second, patient’s knowledge
on provider reputation and quality affects both the behavior of the health care provider as well as
the behavior of the patient. The empirical results suggest that high reputation enables providers
to increase the price for their services (see e.g. Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1981; Haas-Wilson, 1990).
Similarly, in a health care system with fixed fees, physicians with a high reputation might be able
to increase the volume of (unnecessary) medical care without loosing patients. On the patient’s
side, Dafny and Dranove (2008) show that market shares of high quality Medicare HMOs increase
as soon as consumers become aware of the quality differences. Consequently, private information on
provider quality enables patients to make better choices. As a result, better informed individuals
might demand more medical care since the marginal utility of one unit of high quality care is larger
compared to low quality care. Given the arguments stated above, the indirect effect on health
services utilization of diagnostic information is ambiguous. In addition, it is likely to be positive for
physician-specific quality information. However, the crucial point is that an observed relationship
between e.g. physician visits and one of these two types of consumer health information cannot be
taken as evidence for or against the SID hypothesis.
As argued, previously used measures of health information are either unsuitable to find evidence
for or against the SID hypothesis or have at least indirect effects on health care utilization that bias
any estimated inducement effect. To solve this problem, we employ a unique measure of consumer
information that is likely to capture the patient’s ability to distinguish between necessary treatment
4Inappropriate health care provider choice might be only a minor issue as Atella and Deb (2008) recently found
for Italy that primary care physicians and medical specialists are substitute sources of medical care.
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and induced demand. Given the theoretical results by Dranove (1988), Xie et al. (2006) and De
Jaegher (2012), our main hypothesis is that consumer information has a negative effect on health
care utilization given that the demand is positive. In addition, we are able to test whether consumer
information affects the decision to buy preventive care or substitutes office visits. Put differently,
to some extent we are able to check whether our measure of consumer health information captures
diagnostic information as well.
3 The Swiss Health Care System
The Swiss health care system is a mixture between competition enforcing elements and regulations
on the federal as well as the cantonal (state) level.5 The basic health insurance is mandatory
for all Swiss residents, but is provided by private insurance companies. Although the health in-
surance providers are not allowed to make profits in the basic insurance, they can sell profitable
supplementary insurance plans to their customers. General practitioners and specialists are gener-
ally self-employed, mostly paid on a fee-for-service basis (FFS) and individuals can freely choose
their physician.6 In addition, the health insurers are obliged to contract with every licensed health
care provider. Note that the level of fees is a result from negotiation between health insurers and
providers at the cantonal level. However, the general fee structure is established by the federal
government. Furthermore, the government determines the coverage of the basic insurance as well
as the selectable deductible levels and co-payment, and it approves the monthly premium. Thus,
while the basic insurance coverage is fixed, individuals have some choice with respect to their cost
sharing.
Some of the above mentioned features of the Swiss health care system are suspected to stimulate
demand inducement. In his model, Dranove (1988) points out that SID increases in insurance
coverage. As the coverage of the Swiss basic insurance is large, SID might be large as well. In
5An extensive summary on the Swiss health care system is provided in the review of the Swiss Health System
by the OECD (OECD/World Health Organization, 2011) and, in addition, by the European Observatory on Health
Care Systems and the World Health Organization in the Health Systems in Transition (HiT) series (World Health
Organization, 2000).
6Some insurance providers offer health plans where the individuals are bounded to a specific (group of) health
care provider, e.g. HMO or PPO. According to the Swiss Health Survey, only 14.69% of Swiss residents did choose
such a health plan in 2007. Notice that the insurance coverage is not altered by this choice and the selected health
care provider can be changed easily.
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addition, physicians paid on a FFS basis tend to induce demand while fixed salaries and HMOs with
capitation remove the incentives for demand inducement. The findings of Birch (1988) on the market
for dentistry in the United Kingdom corroborate this conclusion about FFS systems. Moreover, due
to the obligation to contract, insurance providers have to reimburse health care expenditures with
limited possibilities to sanction for unnecessary services and malpractice. Consequently, the Swiss
health care system and its features seem to be well-suited to test the SID hypothesis.
4 Empirical approach
The data used in this paper is taken from the Swiss Health Survey conducted in 2007 by the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office. The data is based on a random sample of the Swiss resident population
aged between 15 and 99. The survey consists of a phone interview and an additional paper-based
form, which was answered by 14’393 individuals. The data set from the phone-based interview
includes detailed information about health status and insurance, health related behavior, utilization
of medical services, and the socio-economic background on the individual level. Moreover, some data
about the respondent’s household structure is provided as well. The additional data from the paper-
based part are primarily an extension in terms of health status and utilization of specialized medical
services. Secondary, it adds data about the respondent’s health expertise, labor market situation,
and addiction. Table 1 provides variable definitions and descriptive statistics of both the dependent
and the explanatory variables.
The measure for the individual’s health expertise is constructed using answers to four questions
about the respondent’s self-confidence related to health issues. Concretely, the respondents were
asked to give a self-evaluation about their own abilities dealing with health care issues. In the first
question, the respondents were asked about the importance of critically questioning given health
information. The range of possible answers was from one (very important) to four (not important).
In addition, the fifth possible answer was ‘I cannot assess’ implying that the respondent does not
have the ability to evaluate health information. The other three questions were related to patient
behavior in terms of communication e.g. with a physician, general knowledge about health issues
and consumption behavior in terms of e.g. buying and using over-the-counter drugs. In all three
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questions, the range of possible answers was one (feel very certain) up to five (does not feel certain
at all). We combined these four categorial variables to one dummy variable denoted INFO where
1 indicates that an individual answered all questions with at least ‘important’ or ‘feel certain’. We
expect that this is a good proxy for the individual’s ability to evaluate the physician’s advice. Kenkel
(1990) proceeds in a similar fashion using ten questions about symptoms associated with diabetes,
heart disease, cancer and tuberculosis. More recently, Hsieh and Lin (1997) use twenty questions
about health effects and symptoms associated with high blood pressure and diabetes. While these
information measures are quite objective but narrow due to the restriction on a few diseases, our
information measure is more subjective but broader. In addition, we do not sum up the answers
since we have categorial variables. According to the theoretical arguments, we expect INFO to have
a negative effect on the number of office visits.
With respect to the empirical literature on SID, another important variable is the individual’s
occupation. In the following analysis, we use a dummy-variable denoted MEDOCC indicating the
profession and occupation, respectively. MEDOCC takes the value one if an individual is working
in the health care sector including physicians, dentists, oculists, pharmacists, and physiotherapists.
Additionally, the physician density is of special interest. The well-known positive relationship
between physician density and demand for medical care is one of the starting points of the whole
SID literature (Evans, 1974; Fuchs, 1978; Wilensky and Rossiter, 1983; Reinhardt, 1985; Stano,
1985; Cromwell and Mitchell, 1986) and still under consideration with respect to SID (see e.g.
Carlsen and Grytten, 1998; Xirasagar and Lin, 2006; Peacock and Richardson, 2007). There are
at least two possible explanations for this positive correlation. On the one hand, physicians may
induce more demand in areas with high competition. On the other hand, physicians may settle
down in areas with high demand. Even though the mentioned authors are aware of this endogeneity
problem and commonly apply two-stage least squares, Dranove and Wehner (1993) show that this
empirical approach fails to identify SID due to unsuitable instruments. In addition, more physicians
in a certain area may lower the individual’s cost of health care due to a better access. In fact, Auster
and Oaxaca (1981) show that it is almost impossible to identify SID using the physician density.
Moreover, using non-practice income Grytten et al. (2001) find for Norway some indirect evidence
against the relationship of the physician density and SID. However, all described effects go in the
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same (positive) direction and may significantly alter the demand for health care. Hence, controlling
for the physician density might be appropriate. The corresponding variable denoted PDENS is
defined as the number of physicians per thousand residents. The data is retrieved at the cantonal
level from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
Altough we are mainly interested in the effects of the mentioned variables on utilization given
a positive observed demand, we follow the idea of Hay and Leahy (1982) and estimate a two-part
model, i.e. a non-nested hurdle model using a Poisson regression approach (see Mullahy, 1986).
Hence, we assume that the statistical processes governing individuals to visit a physician and their
number of visits are clearly distinct and different. Note that the variable of interest, the number
of physician visits, exhibits overdispersion meaning that the (conditional) variance is larger than
the (conditional) mean. This violates the assumption of the basic Poisson model such that a
generalized specification should be applied for reasons of efficiency. A common generalization is the
negative binomial regression model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986; Winkelmann and Zimmermann,
1995; Winkelmann, 2008) where the density is given by
f(yj) = Pr(Yj = yj) =
Γ(θ + yj)
Γ(θ)Γ(1 + yj)
(
θ
θ + λj
)θ ( λj
θ + λj
)yj
for yj = 0, 1, 2, . . . N (4.1)
with E[Yj |xj ] ≡ λj = exp(x′jβ), xj is a vector containing the explanatory variables, Γ(∙) is the
standard gamma function and θ ≡ 1α , where α denotes the variance of the gamma distribution.
Note that overdispersion may be due to unobserved heterogeneity in health care utilization. This
can be taken into account by adding an individual error term to the random mean function for Yj , i.e.
λ̃j = exp(x′jβ) ∙ exp(εj) given the underlying assumption that exp(εj) follows a gamma distribution
with mean one and variance α. The negative binomial distribution can then be obtained by inserting
λ̃j in the standard Poisson distribution. Finally, the resulting distribution in (4.1) has conditional
mean E[Yj |xj ] = λj and variance V ar[Yj |xj ] = λj +αλ2j . In the case of α = 0, the negative binomial
distribution collapses to the standard Poisson distribution. Since α has to be estimated, one can
test whether the negative binomial model is appropriate or not.
However, the restriction to strictly positive numbers implies a truncation. The densitiy of the
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truncated negative binomial regression model is given by
f(yj |yj > 0) = Pr(Yj = yj |yj > 0) =
f(yj)
1 −
(
θ
θ+λj
)θ (4.2)
where f(yj) corresponds to the density given by (4.1) and Pr(Yj = 0) =
(
θ
θ+λj
)θ
. Following
Grootendorst (1995), we assume a sample with iid distributed observations (individuals), where
j = 1 . . . n individuals have a positive utilization of medical services and the remaining j = n+1 . . . N
individuals do not visit a physician. The likelihood of the entire sample is then given by
L =
n∏
j=1
Pr(yj > 0|xj) ∙ f(yj |yj > 0, xj) ×
N∏
j=n+1
Pr(yj = 0|xj) (4.3)
or, using the fact that the likelihood function factors into two multiplicative terms:
L1 =
n∏
j=1
Pr(yj > 0|xj) ×
N∏
j=n+1
Pr(yj = 0|xj) (4.4)
L2 =
n∏
j=1
f(yj |yj > 0, xj) (4.5)
The first term depends solely on parameters in the hurdle component of the model, e.g. the binary
choice visiting a physician. In contrast, the second term depends exclusively on parameters in the
level component of the model, e.g. the number of visits given yj > 0. Due to this separability, the
binary probability model can be estimated separately from the truncated negative binomial model
without loosing any information (see also Mullahy, 1998). Therefore, we estimate a logit model for
the binary choice visiting a physician and a truncated negative binomial model for the number of
visits. The vector of explanatory variables, xj , contains the variables mentioned above and some
additional controls which are described in the next paragraph.
Two categories of variables are expected to affect the demand for medical care. The first category
consist of variables capturing the individual health status. These variables are coded such that a
higher value indicates a lower health level. Moreover, the healthiest group of individuals is always the
reference group. We include a self-assessed health status and some more objective measures such as a
variable for the health status based on the symptoms and severity of ten different diseases. Moreover,
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we include dummy variables for chronic diseases, accident within the last year, and pregnancy during
the last twelve months. Finally, we include two variables for mental health status. A dummy variable
indicating a depression and a variable for psychological distress ranging from zero (normal) to two
(high). Since the reference group of all these variables consists of the healthiest respondents, we
expect for most of these variables a positive effect on utilization. The second category contains
variables about the insurance and, therefore, the price of medical care. First, we include a variable
with three categories for the deductible ranging from one (below CHF 1000) to three (above CHF
2000). We expect a negative effect on the utilization of medical services, since an increase in the
deductible implies a higher co-payment of the individual. Second, we include a dummy variable
where one indicates a supplementary insurance that covers complementary medicine. The expected
effect is positive, since the overall coverage increases and the price decreases. The descriptive
statistics of the discussed variables as well as descriptions of additionally used controls are presented
in Table 1.
Table 1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev.
PVISIT a = 1 if the respondent visited a physician within one year 0.8091
VISITSa number of physician visits within one year (including home visits) 4.0707 7.4797
PPHARM a = 1 if the respondent visited a pharmacy within one year 0.3674
PHARM a number of pharmacy visits within one year 0.9142 2.0675
PALT a = 1 if the respondent used alternative medical care within one year 0.3177
ALT a number of visits related to alternative medical care within one year 1.9358 6.0512
DIABa = 1 if the respondent had tested his blood sugar level at least once 0.6775
OSTEOa = 1 if the respondent had tested his bone density at least once 0.1223
CANC a = 1 if the respondent had at least one checkup related to cancer 0.7461
PREV a = 1 if the respondent has DIAB, OSTEO and/or CANC = 1 0.9123
INFO = 1 if the respondent as a high level of medical information 0.1759
MEDOCC = 1 if the respondent has a medical occupation, namely: physicians,
dentists, oculists, pharmacists, and physiotherapists.
0.0386
PDENS number of physicians with practice per 1000 residents (by canton) 1.9928 0.5377
PHADENS number of pharmacies and drugstores per 1000 residents (by canton) 0.3200 0.1187
SUBHLTH self-reported health status (reference group: very good)
good = 1if the respondent reports health status as good 0.6680
fair = 1if the respondent reports health status as fair 0.1049
poor = 1if the respondent reports health status as pour 0.0272
OBJHLTH symptom-based health status, included diseases: pain in the back, ady-
namia, abdominal pain, looseness or costiveness, sleep disorder, headache,
heart palpitation or extrasystole, pain or pressure in the chest, joint pain
or pain in the limbs, and pain in the hands; objective health is constructed
by summing the indicators (range: 0 to 20, reference group: very good)
good = 1 for values 2 and 3 0.3381
fair = 1 for values 4 and 5 0.2417
poor = 1 for values between 6 and 20 0.1220
continued on next page
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Table 1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (cont’d)
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev.
CHRDIS = 1 if the respondent was under medical treatment due to at least one
chronic disease, including migraine, asthma, diabetes, arthrosis, stomach
ulcer, osteoporosis, chronic bronchitis, high blood pressure, heart attack,
apoplexia, renal disease, cancer, allergy, and depression
0.5253
ACCID = 1 if the respondent had an accident at work, at home, road accident,
and/or sporting accident
0.1184
PREGN = 1 if the respondent was pregnant within the last 12 months 0.0082
MAJDEP = 1 if the respondent suffers from clinical depression 0.0516
DEDUCT insurance deductible (reference group: below CHF 1000)
medium = 1 if the respondent has a deductible from CHF 1000 up to CHF 2000 0.2488
high = 1 if the respondent has a deductible above CHF 2000 0.1466
ADDINS = 1 if the respondent has an additional insurance for alternative medicine 0.5700
EMPL gainfully employed (reference group: fully employed)
part-time = 1 if the respondent reports part-time working 0.2445
non = 1 if the respondent reports to be non-working 0.3859
GENDER = 1 if the respondent is female 0.5617
AGE age category of the respondent (reference group: 15 to 30)
36 - 50 = 1 if age between 36 and 50 0.2910
51 - 65 = 1 if age between 51 and 65 0.2560
> 65 = 1 if age above 65 0.2202
HLTHATT = 1 if the respondent reports that health and healthy behavior is impor-
tant for her lifestyle
0.8863
INCOME monthly income of the entire household (reference group: very low)
low = 1 if the respondent reports income of CHF 4500 - 5999 0.1816
medium = 1 if the respondent reports income of CHF 6000 - 8999 0.2914
high = 1 if the respondent reports income of CHF 9000 and more 0.2562
HMO, PPOb = 1 if the respondent has a HMO or PPO health plan 0.1469
SUPPINS b = 1 if the respondent has a supplementary insurance for hospitalization 0.7288
BMI b body mass index = weight in kilos divided by height in meters squared 24.320 4.0515
MIGRb = 1 if the respondent has a migration background 0.2768
COUPLEb = 1 if the respondent is not single 0.6480
NBKIDSb number of childern in the household 0.4194 0.8389
MOUVPHYb frequency of physical activity per week (reference group: never)
sometimes = 1if respondent reports once or twice a week 0.4379
frequent = 1if respondent reports three or more times per week 0.4020
SMOKEb = 1 if the respondent is a smoker 0.2607
ALCOb = 1 if the respondent drinks alcohol 0.8549
DRUGb = 1 if the respondent abused (illegal) drugs during the past two years 0.0387
EDUC3b education level (reference group: mandatory school)
secondary = 1 if respondent completed a secondary education 0.6037
tertiary = 1 if respondent completed a tertiary education 0.2758
DETPSYb = 1 if the psychological distress of the respondent is average or high 0.1676
MASTERYb mastery level of the respondent based on 3 questionnaire (reference group:
weak control)
average = 1 if the respondent has average control 0.4001
strong = 1 if the respondent has strong control 0.3891
IHELPb = 1 if the respondent received informal help given daily difficulties 0.1203
MSREG14b degree of urbanisation (fourteen categories)
a dependent variables
b The corresponding coefficients are not reported in the results tables in this article. Full tables of results can
be found in the Online Appendix B.
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5 Results
Table 2 reports the main results of the logit estimation for the hurdle part given by the likelihood
in (4.4) and estimates obtained from the truncated negative binomial model for the count part
given by the likelihood in (4.5).7 In the estimation of the count component, the INFO coefficient is
significantly negative on the 1% level and suggests a reduction of 0.55 physician visits per year. In
addition, the estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero in the hurdle component.
Hence, being well-informed is unlikely to alter the overall demand. But in case of positive health
service utilization, it seems to reduce the number of office visits. This suggests that our information
measure captures rather the ability to evaluate the physician’s advice than e.g. a preference for
health care. Therefore, we conclude that there is evidence for SID. Contrary to the findings of
Bunker and Brown (1974) and Hay and Leahy (1982), our results suggest that medical professionals
have a significantly lower overall demand as the coefficient of MEDOCC is negative and significant
on the 1% level in both the hurdle and the count component. This provides some evidence that
individuals working in the health care sector have another consumption pattern than non-medical
professionals due to e.g. access to informal care. Therefore, we conclude that medical occupation is
unsuitable to test the SID hypothesis. Finally, the density coefficient in the hurdle component has
a positive effect on utilization. It probably captures an availability effect since it is hard to imagine
that physicians can influence the decision to visit them before they are contacted. Note that
physicians in Switzerland do not advertise their own services in general. Moreover, the coefficient in
the count component is not statistically significant indicating that there is no relationship between
office visits and the number of physicians in a certain area.
As expected, better health leads to a lower probability of visiting a physician and less utilization
given positive demand. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect increases when health status is
further decreased. In particular, poor subjective health status perfectly predicts the probability
to visit a physician. In addition, chronic diseases, an accident, pregnancy and major depression
have a positive effect on both the probability and the number of office visits. While the additional
insurance is associated with and increase in the number of office visits, a higher deductible reduces
7Note that the estimated α is 1.595 and, given a standard error of 0.151, significantly different from zero. Hence,
the choice of the negative binomial model compared to the standard Poisson model is appropriate.
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Table 2: Hurdle model estimates
VARIABLE HURDLE COUNT
INFO -0.01106 (0.01428) -0.55079*** (0.20787)
MEDOCC -0.07403*** (0.02544) -1.23914*** (0.36325)
PDENS 0.04889*** (0.01551) 0.12605 (0.21270)
SUBHLTH
good 0.02106 (0.01377) 0.74476*** (0.18104)
fair 0.11791*** (0.02506) 2.73308*** (0.46669)
poor 7.83676*** (1.73166)
OBJHLTH
good 0.03487** (0.01388) 0.66911*** (0.22393)
fair 0.06773*** (0.01599) 1.00309*** (0.24808)
poor 0.12320*** (0.02270) 1.39256*** (0.33368)
CHRDIS 0.11041*** (0.01275) 1.67858*** (0.21988)
ACCID 0.17967*** (0.02608) 1.47211*** (0.26308)
PREGN 2.27778*** (0.42217)
MAJDEP 0.16070*** (0.03377) 2.05344*** (0.46392)
DEDUCT
medium -0.06339*** (0.01364) -0.93236*** (0.19132)
high -0.11124*** (0.01700) -0.98297*** (0.26416)
ADDINS 0.01157 (0.01189) 0.87921*** (0.19118)
EMPL
part-time 0.03981*** (0.01526) 0.77427*** (0.22641)
non 0.02616 (0.02032) 1.25571*** (0.31077)
GENDER 0.10892*** (0.01387) 0.07436 (0.21884)
AGE
36 - 50 -0.04700*** (0.01516) -0.85493*** (0.27669)
51 - 65 -0.03660** (0.01792) -0.93551*** (0.33105)
> 65 0.04492* (0.02458) -1.01315** (0.42280)
HLTHATT 0.06505*** (0.01813) 0.95762*** (0.28821)
INCOME
low 0.04611** (0.02211) 0.01277 (0.28102)
medium 0.06705*** (0.02129) 0.17326 (0.28159)
high 0.10691*** (0.02197) 0.49739 (0.33078)
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05 and ∗p ≤ 0.10
Marginal effects after estimation of a truncated negative-binomial
hurdle model for physician visits (total N = 9804 and N = 7967
given positive utilization) within one year using data from the Swiss
Health Survey 2007. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Addi-
tionally controlling for the variables described in Table 1, see Online
Appendix B for further details.
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the probability to visit a physician as well as the utilization. Note that income and being female
positively affects the probability of visiting a physician, but has no effect on the number of visits.
Most of the described effects are statistically significant on the 1% level and, at least in terms of
the sign, similar to the results of Kenkel (1990). The latter statement holds also for the estimated
effect of age, which is particularly interesting since it exhibits a somehow counterintuitive negative
sign. One possible explanation is a high correlation between age and the included health measures,
which probably capture the health status very well. Another possibility is that the older individuals
substitute physician care with other medical services (e.g. hospital care) or the elderly receive basic
care in e.g. the retirement home which might decrease the need for physician’s services.
The three main results with respect to the SID hypothesis as well as the other estimated effects are
robust against several changes in the model specification and estimation method. First, we reduce
the number of controls from 32 to 12 and estimate the negative-binomial model again. Second,
we estimate the count part of the hurdle model with ordinary least squares, a negative-binomial
model without truncation at zero and Tobit. In addition, we estimate the (zero-truncated) Poisson
model without taking the overdispersion into account. The corresponding estimates are shown in
Table A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. They are comparable to our main results in terms of sign,
but less precisely estimated. The latter is not surprising, since the other estimation methods are
less efficient compared to the negative-binomial model. Finally, we test several specifications of
the INFO variable in terms of considered questionary answers (out of four) and the threshold level.
Regarding the sign and the significance of the effect, the results are not notably altered by excluding
one variable or by changing the threshold (e.g. to ‘very certain’) of some variables. In summary, we
conclude that our results are robust against changes in the model specification, estimation method,
and the construction of the INFO variable.
While most of the variables used exhibit expected results, our estimation method and information
proxy have some drawbacks. First, information might be endogenous due to e.g. unobserved
heterogeneity that drives both demand for medical services and process acquiring health information
(see Dwyer and Liu, 2013). Therefore, we follow Kenkel (1990) and apply the method described
in Wooldridge (2002, p. 663 - 668) to replicate Kenkel’s results using the present data. In short,
we regress INFO on the full set of covariates and use the predicted residual in the estimation of
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the number of physician visits. We additionally include the inverse mills ratio, lambda, to correct
for sample selection. The standard errors are then bootstrapped using 2000 iterations. As it is
evident from Table A.4, the estimated coefficients are not considerably different from the main
results presented in Table 2 but less precisely estimated. In particular, though the coefficient of
INFO is negative and somewhat larger in absolute terms, it is not statistically different from zero.
However, the fundamental question is whether endogeneity is indeed a problem. Since the coefficient
on the residuals from the first step, IRES, equates 1.172 with a standard error of 2.223, we do not
reject the null hypothesis that INFO is exogenous (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 665). In other words,
endogeneity is not an issue and our approach seems to be appropriate.
Second, regarding the underlying questions in the questionnaire, INFO might capture more than
just the consumer’s ability to evaluate the (treatment) advice of the physician. In particular, a
consumer with a high level of health information might either make better choices in terms of
health care services (e.g. visit the pharmacy instead of the physician) or seek more preventive care
which in turn reduces the probability and severity of certain illnesses. Therefore, we estimate the
hurdle model for pharmacy visits and the utilization of alternative medical services. In addition, we
estimate binary choice models (logit) for preventive care related to diabetes, osteoporosis, cancer
and an aggregate of these three measures. As it is evident from the corresponding in Table A.3,
INFO does not affect the probabilites of using substitutes or preventive care and has no effect
on the number of visits of the considered substitutes for physician services. Although we do not
jointly estimate the consumer’s demand for preventive care, physician’s services and alternative
medical care, these results provide some evidence that INFO captures only the ability to evaluate
the (treatment) advice of the physician.
Besides these concerns about the information measure, our analysis exhibits some limitations.
The outcome variables are rather raw measures for the utilization of medical services and we cannot
control the length of a visit, its quality and the effect on the individual’s health. Some unobserved
quality differences that e.g. affect the demand and are correlated with INFO would bias the esti-
mates and might invalidate our conclusions. However, this would only materialize if the bias is so
large that the sign changes. Regarding the estimation procedure, there are two critical issues. First,
by applying a two-part model we implicitly treat the whole year as one illness episode. In fact, we
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ignore the possibility that an individual decides several times to visit the physician once (per deci-
sion). Second, in some estimations the sample size is reduced to 7828 observations due to missing
data. In particular, unreported income and deductible level account for nearly two thirds of the
missing data. In addition, questions on supplementary insurance, chronic diseases and accidents are
partially unanswered. However, we do not find any systematic differences in the dependent variables
conditional on the missing values. Moreover, the estimates with the reduced set of controls using
up to 9804 observations are comparable to our main results. We therefore conclude that sample
selection is not an issue. In summary, our study exhibits some minor drawbacks. Nevertheless,
the main criticism of previously applied health information measures for testing the SID hypothesis
remains valid and our empirical findings support this view.
6 Conclusion
The underlying question in the literature about SID is whether health care providers exploit their
informational advantage for financial gains. Since the possibility to induce demand depends heavily
on the information gap between provider and patient, one promising way to test the SID hypothesis
is the comparison of well and badly informed patients. While the idea seems straightforward, finding
an acceptable measure for information can be difficult. As we have argued, medical occupation and
symptom based information measures appear to be inappropriate since the utilization of health care
services of individuals with high information in this sense is probably altered through other channels
than just the resistance against demand inducement. Consequently, these information measures are
unsuitable to test the SID hypothesis. Nevertheless, with an information measure that captures
only treatment information that is used by the patient to judge the behavior of the health care
provider, the information gap approach can still be fruitful.
With respect to the broad discussion of the SID hypothesis during the last 40 years, our analysis
yields two interesting results. First, medical professionals have a smaller demand, ceteris paribus.
In particular, they have a lower probability of using medical services and use less of these services,
implying that their overall demand is smaller. Second, less informed people tend to have a higher
utilization of medical services, which supports the SID hypothesis. Moreover, the fact that infor-
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mation measured in this way does not affect the likelihood of buying health care at all supports this
view. In summary, our discussion suggest that medical occupation (and symptom based measures)
cannot be used to test for SID but it is still possible to identify it with an alternative information
measure.
Our results have some important policy implications. First, an increase of the average information
level of the whole population could lead to a lower utilization of health care services and help to
reduce expenditures. Second, it is possible to adapt the health care system such that the incentives to
induce demand are dampened. This could, for example, be achieved by changing the reimbursement
system, since the current FFS system is suspected to facilitate demand inducement. Furthermore,
the obligation to contract between insurer and health care provider could be relaxed such that
insurers can sanction providers who induce demand.
There are some limitations to the approach taken in this paper. In particular, office visits is a
rather raw measure of health care utilization, we cannot account for quality differences of health care
and our information proxy could measure somehow the communication skills of the patient. If she
can express herself more accurately, the physician might give her a more appropriate treatment which
results in fewer follow-up visits. In addition, we do not distinguish between follow-up consultations
and several independent consultations due to the hurdle model approach. These issues might be
resolved by using more detailed data on utilization and consumer information. Nevertheless, our
findings suggest that consumer information plays an important role for the utilization of health care
services. Further research in this area will help to disentangle the relationship between patients and
health care providers and thus help to improve health care systems.
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A Additional Results
Table A.1: Hurdle model with less controls
HURDLE COUNT
INFO -0.00126 (0.01335) -0.35020* (0.19314)
MEDOCC -0.06585*** (0.02218) -0.98449*** (0.35628)
PDENS 0.03200*** (0.01024) 0.20997 (0.12770)
SUBHLTH
good 0.02031 (0.01254) 0.79766*** (0.15778)
fair 0.12475*** (0.02120) 2.95956*** (0.41305)
poor 0.22206*** (0.01077) 8.35165*** (1.41416)
OBJHLTH
good 0.03396*** (0.01263) 0.59343*** (0.20346)
fair 0.06617*** (0.01410) 0.98645*** (0.21771)
poor 0.10785*** (0.02057) 1.49921*** (0.29118)
CHRDIS 0.11314*** (0.01159) 1.72035*** (0.20267)
ACCID 0.18271*** (0.02364) 1.45351*** (0.23908)
PREGN 2.58663*** (0.37926)
MAJDEP 0.11139*** (0.03251) 2.29099*** (0.39601)
DEDUCT
medium -0.05063*** (0.01215) -0.91406*** (0.18004)
high -0.09330*** (0.01544) -1.02429*** (0.22878)
ADDINS 0.02388** (0.01039) 0.76149*** (0.17305)
EMPL
part-time 0.02917** (0.01325) 0.63923*** (0.20859)
non -0.00117 (0.01903) 1.03093*** (0.26385)
GENDER 0.10208*** (0.01189) -0.08749 (0.20101)
AGE
36 - 50 -0.03121** (0.01376) -0.74372*** (0.24521)
51 - 65 -0.01687 (0.01551) -0.67418** (0.28607)
> 65 0.05313** (0.02122) -0.83000** (0.33198)
HLTHATT 0.06719*** (0.01563) 0.74307*** (0.25773)
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05 and ∗p ≤ 0.10
Marginal effects after estimation of a truncated negative-binomial hur-
dle model for physician visits (total N = 9804 and N = 7967 given
positive utilization) within one year using data from the Swiss Health
Survey 2007. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.2: Count component estimates
INFO MEDOCC PDENS
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Regression -0.41003* (0.23355) -1.06667*** (0.28533) 0.09272 (0.28723)
Poisson -0.43135* (0.24453) -1.26875*** (0.34876) 0.05520 (0.26605)
Zero-trunc. Poi. -0.45175* (0.25963) -1.38664*** (0.38912) 0.04891 (0.27804)
neg-bin -0.50122** (0.20799) -1.19191*** (0.33151) 0.12907 (0.21382)
Tobit -0.41003* (0.23253) -1.06667*** (0.28409) 0.09272 (0.28599)
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05 and ∗p ≤ 0.10
Marginal effects for main variables of interest after estimation of the count component given by (4.5) by
OLS as well as under the assumption of a Poisson distribution, a zero-truncated Poisson distribution,
and a negative-binomial distribution and by Tobit. The estimation is based on the Swiss Health Survey
2007 and N = 6483. Robust standard errors in parentheses. We use the same set of controls as in Table
2. Full tables of results are provided in the Online Appendix B.
Table A.3: Substitutes and Prevention
INFO MEDOCC PDENS
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Pharmacy
HURDLE 0.02367 (0.01840) -0.13356*** (0.03417) -0.01581 (0.01887)
COUNT 0.10106 (0.13359) 0.63194 (0.39045) 0.10928 (0.13566)
Alternative med.
HURDLE -0.00101 (0.01479) 0.04390 (0.02805) 0.02989* (0.01621)
COUNT 0.01818 (0.53046) 0.58840 (0.70972) -0.35908 (0.58913)
Prevention
Diabetes 0.01548 (0.01728) 0.10462*** (0.03366) 0.04262** (0.01777)
Osteoporosis 0.00441 (0.01016) 0.01228 (0.02439) 0.01341 (0.01149)
Cancer 0.02084 (0.01435) 0.00121 (0.03243) 0.00126 (0.01490)
overall 0.01385 (0.01232) 0.05117* (0.02822) 0.02388* (0.01276)
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05 and ∗p ≤ 0.10
Marginal effects for main variables of interest after estimation of a truncated negative-binomial hurdle
model for pharmacy visits (total N = 7956 and N = 3086 given positive utilization) and consumption
of alternative medical care (N = 8133 and N = 2053) within one year using data from the Swiss Health
Survey 2007. In addition, marginal effects after estimation of a binary choice model (logit) for preventive
medical care consumption related to diabetes, osteoporosis, cancer and a combined measure (N = 8087,
N = 6360, N = 8098, and N = 8105, respectively). Robust standard errors in parentheses. We use the
same set of controls as in Table 2. Full tables of results are provided in the Online Appendix B.
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Table A.4: Endogeneity Analysis
Dependent Variable
(1) INFO (2) VISITS
IRES 1.17206 (2.22259)
lambda -4.98685*** (1.23783)
INFO -1.39261 (2.23796)
MEDOCC 0.14620*** (0.02678)
EDUC3
secondary 0.04843*** (0.01510)
tertiary 0.07328*** (0.01713)
PDENS -0.00835 (0.00730) 0.01702 (0.12903)
SUBHLTH
good -0.01017 (0.01133) 1.08137*** (0.24278)
fair -0.02643 (0.01968) 2.76102*** (0.39576)
poor -0.05948** (0.02413) 3.63639** (1.56657)
OBJHLTH
good -0.00082 (0.01122) 0.19455 (0.23444)
fair -0.03192*** (0.01166) 0.33758 (0.26949)
poor -0.02435 (0.01603) 0.88473*** (0.32731)
CHRDIS -0.00935 (0.00937) 0.65894*** (0.27783)
ACCID -0.01006 (0.01272) 0.39800 (0.29102)
MAJDEP -0.03867** (0.01766) 1.47224*** (0.36270)
DEDUCT
medium -0.00686 (0.01115) -0.34885 (0.21968)
high 0.02185 (0.01430) 0.04910 (0.33822)
ADDINS 0.03358*** (0.00886) 0.61289*** (0.18802)
EMPL
part-time 0.04370*** (0.01237) 0.32567 (0.25293)
non-working 0.02374* (0.01312) 0.46040* (0.25923)
GENDER 0.00547 (0.01039) -0.44297** (0.22322)
AGE
36 - 50 0.05723*** (0.01124) -0.16860 (0.24390)
51 - 65 0.11326*** (0.01257) -0.13508 (0.35510)
> 65 0.09648*** (0.01478) -0.16183 (0.36369)
INCOME
low 0.00528 (0.01328) 0.35620 (0.24793)
medium 0.01830 (0.01166) 0.07290 (0.23710)
high 0.04677*** (0.01250) -0.03421 (0.28375)
HLTHATT 0.08459*** (0.01070) -0.00023 (0.34579)
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05 and ∗p ≤ 0.10
(1) Regression of INFO on the given covariates using data from the Swiss
Health Survey 2007 (N = 12231) to get predictions for the residuals,
IRES. The latter is used together with the inverse mills ratio, lambda,
in the estimation of the count part (2) (negative binomial model, N =
9727). The presented results for the count part (2) are marginal effects
with bootstrapped standard errors using 2000 iterations.
SID - What kind of consumer information matters? 26
B Online Appendix
Supplementary tables to this paper can be found on the homepage of the corresponding author:
http://staff.vwi.unibe.ch/schmid/downloads/sid_online_appendix.pdf
